COMPENSATION FOR COLLEGIATE ATHLETES:
A RUN FOR MORE THAN THE ROSES

In the context of IntercollegiateAthletics, numerous allegations of

pay for play arrangementsbetween the universities and their athletes have been made. These allegations have been followed by re-

strictions and penalties imposed by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (N.C.A.A.). This Comment explores the propriety
of these sanctions in situations where the student athletes are de-

fined as employees of their universities. If an athlete can be characterized as an employee, then the N.C.A.A. sanctions become vul-

nerable to both antitrust and equal protection attacks. These
attacks become particularly acute when the analysis focuses on
current commercial standardsand proffered rationalesfor current
N.C.A.A. practices. By callingfor greater accountability of the

N.C.A.A., this Comment challenges the organization's authority

and imposition of restrictions on student athletes.
INTRODUCTION

The concept of amateurism in sports was a product of the lateeighteenth century leisure class. Their ideal of the patrician sportsman was part of the pursuit of conspicuous leisure. Accordingly, to
be a pure amateur required independent wealth, because the true
amateur desired no income from his sports participation. Consequently, the amateur ideal represents the notion that an individual's
athletic endeavor must be unrelated to one's work because the sport
itself is somehow sullied or tarnished if the individual is paid for
performance.'
Much of what presently passes for amateur sport in the United
States does not conform to this concept of amateurism. In most areas of sport today, the distinction between the professional and the
amateur is hazy. In the United States, so-called amateur athletes are
supported in several ways. The most frequent means of subsidizing
amateur athletes is through scholarships to colleges and universities.2
I.
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Although college scholarships do not provide incomes comparable to
professional contracts, student athletes are, in actuality, functioning
in a professional capacity inasmuch as their scholarships and other
benefits can be viewed as compensation.'
Unlike their professional counterparts, college athletes do not
function in a free market. College athletes are subject to rigid restrictions imposed by the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA), the major governing body of college athletics. 4 Although
membership in the NCAA is voluntary, institutions wishing to participate in intercollegiate sports realistically have no choice but to be
members. NCAA regulations regarding recruiting, scholarships, and
eligibility seem to be a collusive attempt to retain a clear line of
demarcation between collegiate and professional sports., The
NCAA, by regulating and limiting the freedom of student athletes,
permits American colleges to operate their athletic programs in a
monopolistic manner. Moreover, these regulations establish a ceiling
on athletes' salaries for campus jobs, regulate the length of and criteria for athletic participation, and limit player mobility.,
Nevertheless, there are continuous allegations of under-the-table
payments and other benefits for student athletes in exchange for
their performance on the playing field. 7 It is the thesis of this Comment that student athletes should be compensated well above the
levels of traditional financial aid. Adequate compensation would end
the hypocrisy of labeling major collegiate athletic programs as
amateur. 8
A hypothetical will be posed and analyzed to determine whether a
student athlete, who has an additional university job, can be considered an employee of the university. This determination will be made
by examining worker's compensation statutes. If an athlete who
works in a campus job is considered an employee under such statutes, the question becomes whether the athlete is an employee by
3. See, e.g., Parish v. NCAA, 361 F. Supp. 1220 (W.D. La. 1973), affid, 506
F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975).
4. See Koch, A Troubled Cartel: The NCAA, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB, 135
(1973).
5. See NCAA Bylaws 6-5 (d) 0.1. 602, reprinted in NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASS'N 1984-85 Manual of the National Collegiate Athletic Association 17
(1985) (hereinafter cited as NCAA MANUAL).
6. Koch, The Economics of Big-Time IntercollegiateAthletics, 52 Soc. Sci. Q.
253, 254 (1971).
7. K. DENLINGER & L. SHAPIRO, ATHLETES FOR SALE 22-26 (1975); See also D.
MEGGYESSY, OUT OF THEIR LEAGUE 38-40 (1970); Looney, Deep in Hot Water in Stillwater, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 3, 1978, at 18; Hannon, Too Far, Too Fast, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 20, 1978, at 34; Jones, Playing the Payroll Game, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 25, 1973, at 20.
8. J. MICHENER, SPORTS IN AMERICA 173-93 (1976); Comment, The NCAA,
Amateurism, and the Student-Athlete's Constitutional Rights Upon Ineligibility, 15
NEw ENG. L. REv. 597, 623 (1980).
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reason of his participation on an intercollegiate team. Subsequently,

if the student athlete is considered a university employee it must be
determined whether NCAA rules regulating amateurism in college

athletics violate antitrust or equal protection principles. These issues
arise from the imposition of restrictions on athletic employees which
are inapplicable to other university employees and employees in
general.
A HYPOTHETICAL

In 1982, Jeffrey Bender was one of the most sought after high
school football players in the United States. As an All-American
running back, Bender broke every high school rushing record in
Pennsylvania. Major college football powers from across the country
sent Bender letters, visited him at school, and had him visit their
universities. After a spring of countless scholarship offers, Bender
decided to attend a university in the midwest. The football team of
the university had been ranked number one in the nation twice in the
previous five years. Additionally, the head coach at the university
was nationally renowned and had placed many athletes in the professional ranks.
In April of his senior year, Bender signed a letter of intent to attend the university. In return, Bender was offered an athletic scholarship which included tuition, books, room and board, "and other
expenses." The offer also included a campus job to provide funds for
personal expenses, although the nature and terms of the job were left
undecided.
During Bender's first year at the university he made only a small
contribution to the team's success. The level of his contribution was
understandable, because the team had a policy of using freshman
players sparingly. Bender expected a successful second season.
During his first year Bender was assigned the job of watering the
lawns of the university's two intramural fields. The job required that
each morning Bender check all sprinkler heads for defects, then turn
on the sprinkler system from a main terminal. After the lawns were
sufficiently watered, Bender would turn off the system and continue
on his regular daily schedule. The entire task took less than one hour
per day, six days a week; Bender was paid $150 per week. His job
was renewable annually but its continuation was contingent upon
Bender maintaining his position on the football team.
The football season ended in early January. Spring practice for
the following season started in April. During January the cold and

snow of the midwestern winter made Bender's campus job more
difficult. In the event of rain or snow Bender was instructed not to
water the fields but to continue his daily inspections of the sprinkler
system. One day in January, Bender slipped on some icy grass while
checking the system and badly lacerated his knee on one of the
sprinklers. Bender received some stitches and was instructed to use
crutches for two months. The crutches kept pressure off of his knee
to speed his recovery before spring practice. Because of his accident,
Bender was unable to work at his campus job and sought worker's
compensation benefits from the State Industrial Accident Commission for the two months of work he missed.
DEFINING THE ATHLETE AS AN EMPLOYEE BASED ON WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION CASES

A typical worker's compensation statute9 sets forth two criteria
that must be met before a claimant can recover benefits. The claimant must first qualify as an employee. 10 The claimant must then
demonstrate that he suffered a personal injury by an accident arising
out of and in the course of employment."
In light of Bender's campus employment contract, the continuation of which was contingent upon his athletic participation, a court
would likely conclude that under this contract he was an employee of
the university. 1 2 Furthermore, his knee injury was suffered in the
9. By definition, workmen's compensation acts are state statutes which provide
for fixed awards to employees or their dependents in case of employment-related accidents and diseases. This dispenses with the need of proving negligence in a legal action.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1439 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). Workmen's compensation statutes
preclude the use of common law defenses by the employer; they are not, however, a
guarantee of automatic recovery. The claimant still has the burden of demonstrating that
the elements set out in the particular statute are established in the subject case. 2 T.
HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 11-2 (1956); W. PROSSER & P. KEETON,
TORTS § 80 (1984).
10. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1 (1982), Case law

indicates that the presence of an employment contract is consistently the particular issue
that receives the greatest attention in these cases. See, e.g., Van Horn v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 219 Cal. App. 2d 457, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1963); State Compensation Ins.
Fund v. Industrial Comm'n, 135 Colo. 570, 314 P.2d 288 (1957); University of Denver v,
Nemeth, 127 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 423 (1953); Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of
Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983). See also Steinbach, Workmen's Compensation
and the ScholarshipAthlete, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 523 (1970), wherein the writer states:
"In order to recover under Workmen's Compensation Act(s), the relation of employeremployee must exist, the employee must show. . . his injuries resulted from the work he
was employed to perform and . . . were received while engaged in the business of his
employer .

. . ."

In Rensing, the court indicated that the essential task of a would-be

recipient was to demonstrate the existence of an employer-employee relationship. 444
N.E.2d at 1172.
11. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 10, at § 1.
12. See Van Horn v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 219 Cal. App. 2d 457, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 169 (1963); State Compensation Fund v. Industrial Comm'n, 135 Colo. 570, 314
P.2d 288 (1957); University of Denver v. Nemeth, 127 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 423 (1953);
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course of his employment, at his work place. In light of these facts,
Bender's attempt to receive worker's compensation for his initial
two-month absence from work has a high probability of success.
Bender's knee completely healed by the start of spring practice.
After two weeks of impressive scrimmage performances, however,
Bender was stricken with an additional misfortune. During an intrasquad game, Bender, while attempting to run from approaching
tacklers, severely injured his ankle. The X-rays indicated torn cartilage and ligaments, and Bender's ankle was placed in a cast for protection. Bender was advised that he would-be in a cast for up to
three months but after an extensive rehabilitation program he could
probably return to football for the following year's spring practice.
Additionally, the university informed Bender that his campus job
would be suspended until he recuperated, but his scholarship would
remain intact. Bender proceeded to file a claim with the State Industrial Accident Commission to obtain worker's compensation for his
football-related accident.
Athletes have attempted to recover workmen's compensation in
only a few reported cases. 13 The first case to discuss the issue of
employee status of a college athlete on scholarship was University of
Denver v. Nemeth.1 4 Nemeth was a college football player who performed custodial services at the tennis courts owned by the university. Nemeth was paid nominally for his services but his student
housing rent was waived as additional remuneration. The athlete was
injured during spring football practice and subsequently filed a
worker's compensation claim. Nemeth alleged that he was an employee of the university and contended that he was given the job
solely because he was a member of the football team.
The court rejected the university's contention that Nemeth was
not a "regular employee" and that his job was unrelated to his playing football. Instead, the Nemeth court felt the evidence established
that the student athlete's job had been contingent upon athletic participation and prowess. The court indicated that a nexus existed between the campus job and participation in athletics, holding that the
injury arose out of Nemeth's employment and was therefore
compensable. 5
Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 437 N.E.2d 78 (Ind. App. 1982), rev'd,
444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983); Tookes v. Florida State Univ., 266-39-0855, Dep't. of
Labor and Employment Security, Office of the Judge of Industrial Claims (Fla. 1982).
13. See infra note 22.
14. 127 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 423 (1953).
15. The evidence showed that Nemeth was told by university authorities that "it

The court's rationale was thaf because Nemeth's university job
was contingent on his athletic abilities, he should receive worker's
compensation for an athletic injury just as if he had been injured
while performing custodial services. 16 Moreover, in awarding benefits
to the athlete, the court was guided by the precept that worker's
compensation acts are to be remedial in nature. These statutes are
usually given a liberal construction in order to accomplish the purposes intended. Courts generally hold
that such a construction
17
should work in favor of the claimant.
In Van Horn v. Industrial Accident Commission, 8 a California
district court held that dependents of a college football player killed
in a plane crash while returning from a football game were entitled
to worker's compensation death benefits. The court stated that employee status is achieved only where the evidence shows that an employment contract existed.' 9 In Van Horn, it was sufficiently clear to
the court that the student athlete was not a volunteer nor a donor of
charitable services, but was rather an employee within the full meaning of the worker's compensation act. 20 The Van Horn court held
that the student was an employee because the only reasonable inference which could be drawn from the evidence was that the decedent
received the scholarship due to his athletic prowess and participation.21
Even though Van Horn had a campus job consisting of lining the
football field, the court based its decision on his athletic scholarship.
Hence, the case stands for the proposition that an athletic scholarship alone is enough to establish an employment contract.2 2 Van
Horn thus extends the Nemeth ruling to a situation where a college
athlete receives a scholarship in exchange for participation in a
would be decided on the football field who receives the meals and jobs." Id. at 389-90,
275 P.2d at 425-26.
16. Id. at 391, 257 P.2d at 430.
17. Keenon v. Young, 119 Ohio App. 233, 195 N.E.2d 382 (1963); Van Horn v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, 219 Cal. App. 2d 457, 466, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169, 174 (1963);
Nelson v. Industrial Comm'n, 150 Ohio St. 1, 80 N.E.2d 430 (1950).
18. 219 Cal. App. 2d 457, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1963).
19. Id. at 467, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
20. Id. at 464-65, 33 Cal. Rptr. 173. But see Athletic Ass'n of Univ. of I11.
v.
Industrial Comm'n, 384 I11. 208, 51 N.E.2d 157 (1943), where a member of the swimming team, who was not receiving remuneration, was injured while taking part in a circus staged by the physical education department and was denied workmen's compensation because he was a mere volunteer and not an employee.
21. 219 Cal. App. 2d 457, 466, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169, 174 (1963).
22. Id. at 466, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 174. See also Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 16
N.C. App. 117, 191 S.E.2d 379, cert. denied, 282 N.C. 307, 192 S.E.2d 197 (1972);
Begley v. Corporation of Mercer Univ., 376 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Tenn. 1973). In both
Taylor and Begley, the court held that employment contracts existed between the respective athletes and schools for whom they competed. It should be noted, however, that
these cases were not workmen's compensation cases, but rather breach of contract
actions.
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school's athletic program; the athlete will be found to be an
employee of the school even in the absence of an additional obligation for non-athletic services.
Van Horn and Nemeth are distinguishable from the Colorado case
23
of State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Industrial Commission.
To support its denial of compensation benefits, the court in State
Compensation noted that the college which the injured athlete attended was not a "big time" football school with a program that
generated large revenues; thus, the school received an insubstantial
benefit from this type of recreation. 24 Consequently, State Compensation,2 5 for purposes of making a determination in the hypothetical,
would seem to limit Van Horn and Nemeth to those instances where "
a school has materially benefited from the student's activities and
where the continuance of financial aid is solely dependent upon his
performance of those activities.26
In Rensing v. Indiana State University Board of Trustees,2 the
Supreme Court of Indiana reversed an appellate court decision
awarding workmen's compensation benefits to an athlete. The court
held that a scholarship athlete is not an employee of the university
for which he or she competes. In reaching its conclusion, the court
all but ignored decisions in other jurisdictions relevant to this issue.2 8
Instead, the court chose to place particular emphasis upon provisions
of the NCAA constitution to determine the existence or absence of a
contractual relationship between a college athlete and his or her
school.2 9
23.

135 Colo. 570, 314 P.2d 288 (1957). In this case, an athlete died as a result

of a head injury sustained in a college football game. The Colorado Industrial Commission awarded death benefits to the player's widow. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, however, because no evidence existed to show that the athlete's employment was
dependent upon playing football.
24. Id. at 573-74, 314 P.2d at 290.
25. In State Compensation the award was denied because the athlete's job was
not connected to his participation in the school's' football program. Therefore, simply
performing on a university's athletic team did not confer employee status upon the athlete for purposes of worker's compensation. However, the court noted that when an athlete receives a financial benefit in exchange for and conditional upon participation in the
school's athletic program, the athlete would be considered an employee of the university
for purposes of worker's compensation. Id.
26. Id. at 570, 314 P.2d at 288.
27. 444 N.E.2d 1170.
28. The Rensing court relegated Van Horn to passing mention in a string citation,
and incorrectly asserted that the Van Horn court had denied the claimant therein employee status. Id. at 1174.
29. The court was not persuasive in its attempt to establish, by use of the NCAA
constitution, that college athletics is a non-business activity and merely an extension of

One of three rationales used by the Rensing court in determining
not to award worker's compensation was that a student is not a paid

"employee" unless he or she has a university job in addition to re-

ceiving athletic scholarship benefits.30 Taken together, Rensing and
State Compensation appear to require a scholarship tied to athletic
participation, a direct benefit received by the university from the
athletic participation, and an additional university job to classify the
student athlete as an 3 1employee enabling him or her to receive
worker's compensation.
In the hypothetical case the facts militate in favor of Bender's
ability to obtain worker's compensation benefits as a result of his
second, football related, injury. The hypothetical facts clearly pass
the tests of Nemeth and Van Horn. Bender's scholarship was tied to
his athletic participation, which benefited the university in various
ways. Furthermore, he received an additional university job, thereby
satisfying the tests of Rensing and State Compensation.
INVALIDATION OF

NCAA

RESTRICTIONS ON STUDENT ATHLETE
COMPENSATION

Bender proceeded to spend the entire football season and most of
the off-season rehabilitating his damaged ankle. During this period,
he grew more dissatisfied with the climate of the midwest. He dethe educational process. First, the NCAA provisions fail to recognize the nagging reality
that major college athletics is a business. Furthermore, the NCAA's frequent references
to basing competition upon the athlete's athletic ability strongly support the position that
the school's extension of financial aid, in return for the athlete's participation in its program, is a bargained-for exchange in the nature of a traditional employment contract.
See Note, Rensing v. Indiana State University Board of Trustees: The Status of the
College Scholarship Athlete, 13 CAP. U.L. REV. 87 (1983).
30. 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1174. One of the other two arguments was that NCAA
rules forbid athletes from receiving "pay." Id. Because Rensing never lost his eligibility,
whatever he did receive was not considered "pay" by the NCAA. NCAA CONST. arts. 31-(9)-(1) & 3-1-(g)-2, reprintedin NCAA Manual, supra note 5 at 7. The final argument was that the Internal Revenue Service does not tax scholarship proceeds. I.R.C. §
117 (1983); 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1174. Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 444
N.E.2d 1170, 1174 (Ind. 1983). See also Tookes v. Florida State Univ. 266-39-0855,
Dep't of Labor and Employment Security, Office of the Judge of Industrial Claims 6
(Fla. 1982), wherein the Deputy Commissioner of the Florida Department of Labor and
Employment Security held that an injured college basketball player who received tuition,
registration, fees, meals, room, books, and other incidental expenses under his athletic
scholarship was not entitled to worker's compensation. The commissioner stated that
Tookes' scholarship was not consideration for a contract for his basketball services. If
Tookes had been given a university job, however, he would have been an employee. The
commissioner also pointed out that Tookes only played an average of three to five minutes per game and, thus, the school did not materially benefit from his activities. Id. at
10.
31. Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1174 (Ind.
1983); Tookes v. Florida State Univ., 266-39-0855, Dep't. of Labor and Employment
Security, Office of the Judge of Industrial Claims (Fla. 1982); State Compensation Fund
v. Industrial Comm'n, 135 Colo. 570, 573, 314 P.2d 288, 290 (1957).
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cided that he wanted to live in a warmer area, and he inquired at
some western regional schools about the possibility of a transfer.
Bender was aware that transferring would mean he would be ineligible to compete for another year. 2 A few schools were quite interested and offered Bender a financial package similar to the one he
was receiving at the midwestern university. Additionally, the negotiating schools convinced Bender that another year of rehabilitation
would be beneficial to his career.
Bender confided in the athletic director at his university about his
unhappiness. In an attempt to thwart negotiations with competing
universities, the director offered Bender $500 per week as additional
compensation along with the termination of his field maintenance
job. Thus, Bender would receive benefits based solely on his status as
an athlete. Bender accepted the offer once it had been put in writing.
Unfortunately, he made the mistake of telling several of the schools
with which he had negotiated.
After a full year of rehabilitation, Bender achieved great success
as a starting running back. Bender seemed destined for an outstanding football career. Then, after the third game of Bender's junior
year, NCAA officials contacted the athletic director about possible
infractions of NCAA rules.3 3 A western regional member of the
NCAA had filed a complaint with the association alleging the failure
of Bender's university to comply with the conditions and obligations
of membership in the NCAA.3 Accordingly, Bender's university was
32. NCAA Bylaws art. 5 § 1 (j)-(7), reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5
at 86.
33. The NCAA promulgates and enforces rules designed to keep competition
honest, balanced, and as inexpensive as possible, given commercial and competitive realities. See e.g., NCAA Bylaws arts. 1, 6, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5, at
35-45, 72-74. In furtherance of these goals, a stated purpose of the Association is: "[t]o
maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the
athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of
demarcation between college athletics and professional sports." NCAA CONsT. art. 2, §
2, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5, at 5-6. To help insure this demarcation,
the NCAA establishes eligibility requirements for the student athlete for both the regular season contests and the NCAA championships. NCAA CONsT. art. 3, §§ 1, 3 and
NCAA BYLAWS arts. 1, 4, § 1, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 34, at 7-13, 3545, 55-62.
34. In addition to complaints resulting from self-disclosure, the Committee on Infractions accepts and considers complaints from any "responsible" source. Enforcement
Program, infra note 37, § 2(b), reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5, at 200.
Section 1. Principle of Amateurism and Student Participation. An amateur student
athlete is one who engages in a particular sport for the educational, physical, mental and
social benefits derived therefrom and to whom participation in that sport is an avocation.
(a) An individual shall not be eligible for participation in an intercollegiate
sport if the individual:

obligated to suspend his eligibility. 35 After further investigations by
the NCAA Committee on Infractions, Bender's university was heav-

ily sanctioned for a two-year period. The sanctions included ineligibility to participate in NCAA championships, a ban on television
games, prohibitions against the recruitment of student athletes, and
a reduction in the number of initial athletic scholarships per class
permitted to be awarded.3 6 These sanctions posed immediate and future threats to both Bender and his university's athletic program.
ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS

One of the legal bases used to contest the NCAA's authority in
other areas is the federal antitrust law.37 Recent decisions suggest
that antitrust law may indeed have some relevance to the regulatory
(1) Takes or has taken pay, or has accepted the promise of pay, in any form, for
participation in that sport, including the promise of pay when such pay is to be
received following completion of the intercollegiate career; or
(2) Has directly or indirectly used athletic skill for pay in any form in that
sport; however, a student athlete may accept or have accepted scholarships or
educational grants-in-aid administered by an educational institution that do not
conflict with the governing legislation of this Association, and may receive compensation authorized by the United States Olympic Committee to cover financial loss occurring as a result of absence from employment to prepare for or
participate in the Olympic Games.
0.1.2. The term "pay" specifically includes, but is not limited to, receipt directly
or indirectly of any salary, gratuity or comparable compensation; division or
split of surplus; educational expenses not permitted by governing legislation of
this Association, and excessive or improper expenses, awards and benefits. Expenses received from an outside amateur sports team or organization in excess
of actual and necessary travel and meal expenses for practice and game competition shall be considered pay.
NCAA CoNsT. art. 3, § 1, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5, at 9.
35. The NCAA does not take action directly against the student athlete; as a
condition of membership, colleges and universities are obligated to terminate or suspend
a student athlete's eligibility when they discover infractions, or when violations are
brought to their attention by the NCAA. NCAA CoNsT. art. 4, § 2(a), reprinted in
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5, at 29. See also Recommended Policies and Practices for
Inter-Collegiate Athletics, Policy 13, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5, at 196.
Not only is the institution contractually bound to act, but if it "fails to take appropriate
action, the involved institution shall be cited to show cause under the Association's regular enforcement procedures why it should not be disciplined for failure to do so." Furthermore, a member institution is very likely to initiate a complaint against itself since
"such disclosure shall be considered as a mitigating factor in determining the penalty [to
be imposed]." Official Procedure Governing the NCAA Enforcement Program § 9 (a),
reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5, at 207 [hereinafter cited as Enforcement
Program].
36. Enforcement Program § 7 (b), reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5, at
204.
37. See Hennessey v. NCAA, No. CA 76-P-0799-W (N.D. Ala. Sept. 27, 1976),
afd per curiam, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 928 (1979);
Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975); Kupec v. Atlantic Coast Conference, 399 F. Supp. 1377 (M.D.N.C. 1975); College Athletic Placement Serv., Inc. v.
NCAA, 1975 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 60,117 (D.N.J.), affid, No. 74-104 (3rd Cir. Nov. 25,
1974); Samara v. NCAA, 1973 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 74,536 (D.C. Va.). See also Justice
v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983).
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activities of the NCAA.38
A prerequisite for application of the Sherman Antitrust Act 3 9
(Sherman Act) is that the activity in question must involve or affect
interstate commerce.4 0 The NCAA schedules games and tournaments requiring the transportation of teams across state lines, and
regulates recruiting taking place on a nationwide basis.' In addition,
the NCAA controls bids involving hundreds of millions of dollars for
the interstate television broadcasting of intercollegiate sporting
events.42 Consequently, courts have concluded that NCAA activities

affect interstate commerce. 3

The next consideration is the extent to which the Sherman Act is

applicable to non-commercial organizations such as the NCAA. Traditionally, judicial doctrines of immunity shielded self-regulating organizations from antitrust scrutiny.4 4 However, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,45 the Supreme Court rejected accepted notions of

antitrust immunity.4 6 Consequently, the trend is to require that orga-

38. See, e.g., Hennessey v. NCAA, No. CA 76-P-0799-W (N.D. Ala. Sept. 27,
1976), aJfd per curiam, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 928
(1978).
39. Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1982).
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.
It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces
will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the
highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political
and social institutions. But even were that premise open to question, the policy
unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition. And to this end it prohibits
'Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States.'
Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958).
40. Id.
41. See generally Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1150 (5th Cir. 1978).
42. See Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276,
1291-92 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd in part, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd 104 S.
Ct. 2948 (1984).
43. See cases cited supra note 37.
44. See Note, The Applicability of the Sherman Act to Legal Practiceand Other
"Non Commercial" Activities, 82 YALE L.J. 313, 325 (1972).
45. 421 U.S. 773 (1973). Courts have used the "traditionally noncommercial"
theory to immunize the NCAA from Sherman Act review. See Jones v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975); College Athletic Placement Serv. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 1975-1 Trade Cas. T 60,117, at 65,267
(D.N.J.), aff'd mem., 506 F.2d 1050 (3rd Cir. 1974); cf. Amateur Softball Ass'n v.
United States, 467 F.2d 312, 315 (10th Cir. 1972) (reserving judgment on the question
of whether the "trade or commerce" exemption applies to amateur athletics).
46. The Court rejected the "trade or commerce" doctrine because it could not

nizations engaged in substantial economic activities defend their regulations on the merits.47 Applying this approach, it is clear that
NCAA activities generate substantial revenue, 48 and that the
NCAA is quite capable of imposing considerable restraint upon
avowedly commercial enterprises, whether or not it is engaged in
commercial activity itself.4 9 Moreover, NCAA definitions of student

eligibility have potentially significant economic consequences for
both the student and the school recruiting him.5"

Upon determination that an NCAA rule is subject to review under
"find support for the proposition that Congress intended any such sweeping exclusion."
Furthermore, in rejecting the notion that the nature of the occupation served to shield
anticompetitive activities from antitrust liability, the Court implicitly rejected the "traditionally noncommercial" doctrine. 421 U.S. at 787-88. The Court left open, however, the
possibility that the nature of the occupation could play a role in evaluating anticompetitive practices. See id. at 788 n.17. There is no doubt that the sweeping language of
section 1 applies to nonprofit entities, id. at 786-87, and in the past the Court has imposed antitrust liability on nonprofit entities which engage in anticompetitive conduct.
See, e.g., American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng's, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556,
576 (1982).
47. At least two other courts have relied on Goldfarb to hold that the NCAA is
subject to antitrust scrutiny. See Hennessey v. NCAA, No. CA 76-P-0799-W, slip op. at
14-16 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 27, 1976) (specifically refusing to distinguish NCAA from bar
association); Board of Regents v. NCAA, 561 P.2d 499 (Okla. 1977) (construing
Oklahoma statute with language similar to Sherman Act section 1).
48. In 1979-80 and 1980-81 the NCAA had total revenues of $20.2 million and
$23.3 million, respectively, of which over 25% in both years was derived from its Division
I men's national championship events and the sales of television rights thereto. In addition, the NCAA received eight percent of its members' in-season football television proceeds, amounting to over $2,000,000 each year. Division II national championships and
related television rights accounted for $885,000 (4.4%) of the NCAA's total revenue in
1979-80 and $836,000 (3.6%) in 1980-81. Division III championships and related television rights amounted to $257,000 (1.2%) in 1979-80 and $316,000 (1.4%) in 1980-81.
Membership dues income was $201,000 in 1979-80 and $206,000 in 1980-81. AIAW v.
NCAA, 558 F. Supp. 487, 490 (D.D.C. 1983), affd, 735 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
49. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D.
Okla. 1982); Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977); cf.AIAW v. NCAA,
558 F. Supp. 483, (D.D.C. 1983); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
"It cannot be seriously maintained that college football is not a business, or that the
relationship between a college and a student athlete is not a business relationship." Barile
v. Univqrsity of Virginia, 2 Ohio App. 3d 233, 239, 441 N.E.2d 608, 616 (1981). Goldfarb makes it clear that antitrust laws will be applied where the activity or relationship
involved is of a business character.
50. See K. DENLINGER & L. SHAPIRO, supra note 7, at 37, where the authors
state: "Some athletes generate 10 and 20 times as much income as their scholarship is
worth to the school; a very few generate perhaps 100 times what they receive."
Of course, any sanction imposed upon the institution indirectly affects the student athletes at that institution. For instance, if an institution's basketball team is declared ineligible for participation in the postseason NCAA tournament, the players on that team
pay a personal price if they earn the right to attend yet are barred from doing so. Furthermore, student athletes on the so-called minor sports teams at the ineligible institution
may also suffer because of the lost television revenue from the major sports that would
have filtered through the athletic department to eventually aid the minor sports. This can
be a particularly severe result today when fiscal problems trouble athletic departments
throughout the country. See also Buckton v. NCAA, 336 F. Supp. 1152, 1154 (D. Mass
1973); Behagen v. Intercollegiate Conference, 346 F. Supp. 602, 604 (D. Minn. 1972).
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the antitrust laws, the question becomes whether the particular restraint is per se illegal or merely subject to review under the rule of
reason standard. Illegality per se rests upon two criteria: (1) the noncompetitive harms of the practice must outweigh any possible benefits; 5 1 and (2) any judicial attempt to identify cases in which the
practice is not, on balance, harmful must necessarily waste judicial
resources and add costly elements of uncertainty to the law.5 2 If a
practice fits within the per se criteria, the practice normally is held
to violate the antitrust laws "regardless of any asserted justification
or alleged reasonableness. 5 3 Conversely, the rule of reason allows
the court to consider the actual
economic effect of the practice and
54
the group's justification for it.
51. When a practice is deemed illegal per se, it has been judged to have such a
"pernicious effect on competition" and such a "lack of any redeeming virtue" that it will
nearly always cause an unreasonable restraint of trade. Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). The Court has cited this language with approval
several times during the last twenty years. E.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596,' 607
(1972). See also Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983); Elman, "Petrified
Opinions" and Competitive Realities, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 625, 626-27 (1966).
52. Certainty of the legal rule helps to reduce the cost of compliance with that
rule. See Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL
STUD. 257, 262-67 (1974). The "bright line" prohibitions inherent in per se rules are
especially valuable in the antitrust field because the law must be explained to corporate
personnel, who usually lack legal training. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Per se rules are a means of reducing the complexity that
plagues antitrust litigation; they also reflect an awareness that courts are ill-suited to
make complex economic judgments. See Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 520 F.2d 1231, 1238
(2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1975); Flittie, The Sherman Act Section 1 Per
Se - There Ought To Be A Better Way, 30 Sw. L.J. 523 (1976).
53. Loevinger, The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 23, 26
(1964). See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 (1940) (price
fixing); Flittie, supra note 52, at 530 (listing practices labeled per se violations). A literal
reading of section 1 would eliminate the right to contract, because all contracts necessarily restrain trade. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. (N.J.) v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60
(1911); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 355 (1897)
(White, J. dissenting). Consequently, the Supreme Court has held that section 1 prohibits only unreasonablerestraints of trade. Nevertheless, the Court has long held that certain types of contracts are irrebuttably presumed to be unreasonable and are thus per se
violations of section 1. See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price
Fixing and Market Division (Part 1), 74 YALE L. J. 775, 785-805 (1965).
54. There are numerous legal commentaries dealing generally with the per se and
rule of reason standards. The reader looking for basic introductions might wish to consult
G. GELHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL chs. 5-6 (1976). The

intricacies of the issues in this area are treated in an more exhaustive fashion in Bork
(Parts I and II), supra note 53, at 775. See generally Note, Trade Association Exclusionary Practices:An Affirmative Role for the Rule of Reason, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1486
(1966); Von Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine - An Emerging Philosophy of Antitrust
Law, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 569 (1964); Van Cise, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law,
50 VA. L. REV. 1165 (1964); Handler, Recent Developments in Antitrust Law: 1958-59,

In the hypothetical, Bender and his university were sanctioned for
their violation of the NCAA compensation rule.

5

Compensation, in

economic terms, is the price of the athlete's services. 56 The NCAA

rules concerning financial aid effectively place a ceiling on the price

that a school can pay for the services of its student athletes. Consequently, NCAA rules limiting compensation (in the form of "financial aid") constitute price fixing among horizontal competitors in the
market for athletic services.5 7 Horizontal price-fixing is an artificial
ceiling on costs set by competitors at the same commercial level. In
other words, the fixing of the prices constitute the "financial aid"

that universities utilize to compensate their athletes. Horizontal
price-fixing is ordinarily condemned as "illegal per se" because of

the high probability that the practice is anticompetitive. 5 Moreover,
price restriction is a paradigmatic example of a restraint of trade
which the Sherman Act was enacted to prohibit." Because such
jointly imposed wage controls are not tolerated in other contexts,
they should be similarly condemned where the NCAA is involved.
Traditionally, courts have not found the criteria for proper application of the per se rule to be satisfied in the context of self regula-

tory bodies. They have been reluctant to apply the per se rule in this
context because self regulatory organizations are generally interested

in benefitting a class beyond the immediate members of the organi-

zation.60 The courts have deviated from the per se rule in two ways.
59 COLUM. L. REV. 843 (1959); Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust
Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 847 (1955); J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND
TRADE REGULATIONS §§ 6.01-.02 (1971).
55. NCAA CONST., art. 3 § I (a)(3), reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5,
at 9.
56. Although colleges euphemistically label this compensation "financial aid,"
there can be no question that this aid is, in fact, compensation; student athletes exchange
their athletic skills, in quid pro quo, for a package of goods and services. The athletic
award may not be adjusted during the award's period on the basis of the student's athletic ability, a disabling injury, or any other athletic reason. The award may be graduated or cancelled, however, if the student is declared ineligible for intercollegiate competition, engages in fraud or serious misconduct, or withdraws from a sport for personal
reasons. NCAA CONST. art. 3 § 4(c), reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5, at 20.
Furthermore, if an athlete is injured or fails to perform well athletically, his grant need
not be renewed for the next period. NCAA, CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS CASE BOOK OF
THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, No. 107, reprinted in NCAA
MANUAL,

supra note 5, at 273.

57. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222 (1940)
(price fixing occurs "if the range within which purchases or sales will be made is agreed
upon"). The costly extremes to which college coaches have resorted to lure some high
school athletes are an indication that member schools may be willing to offer compensation in excess of NCAA limits to certain athletes.
58. A per se rule is applied when "the practice facially appears to be one that
would always or almost always tend to restrict competition ...
" Broadcast Music, Inc.
v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979).
59. NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
60. Ordinary business cartels sometimes serve larger social interests, and self regulating associations sometimes serve the commercial interests of their members. The dis-
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First, some courts have used the rule of reason standard to examine
self-regulatory activities that would be per se illegal in the ordinary
commercial setting.6 Second, other courts have created an irrebuttable presumption of reasonableness where the nature, purpose,
and
2
character of the challenged practice is non-commercial.
In the context of antitrust law, most NCAA regulations have been
evaluated under a rule of reason standard which allows judicial deference to be paid to the non-commercial goals of the regulation being challenged.6 3 Under this standard, the plaintiff must establish
that the regulation restrains trade and that the restraint is unreasonable in light of the justifications asserted by the defendants. For the
NCAA, the professed justification is the desirability of promoting
and protecting a system of educationally related amateur athletics.
In the hypothetical case, Bender would most likely attempt to
show that the regulation interferes with his right as an athlete to
realize the maximum economic return for his talent. The NCAA's
defense would focus on the close relationship between the activity
regulated and the NCAA's central objective. The availability of a
less restrictive alternative is usually strong evidence for a plaintiff
who can demonstrate that his livelihood is endangered. However, it
is unlikely that Bender would be able to use this approach to mount
a significant attack on the rule in question.6 4 The rule considered
here concerns a matter at the heart of the NCAA's concerns; that is,
the amateur status of the activities it regulates. Consequently, a rule
of reason approach will probably result in a judgment for the
65
NCAA.
tinction (largely of degree rather than kind) turns on the nature and purpose of the
organization. Some examples of self-regulatory organizations are bar associations, medi-

cal associations, school accrediting agencies, and amateur athletic associations. Id.
61.

Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. CA 76-P-0799-W

(N.D. Ala. Sept. 27, 1976); Board of Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 561
P.2d 499 (Okla. 1977) (construing Oklahoma statute with language similar to Sherman

Act Section 1).
62. Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626, 632 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977) ("to survive a Sherman Act challenge a particular
practice, rule, or regulation . . . must serve the purpose for which the profession exists,
viz. to serve the public."); Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586
F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978). The opinions, however, are not entirely clear about whether a
practice would be conclusively held reasonable if both commercial and noncommercial
elements are present.
63. See cases cited supra note 37.
64. See Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1153 (5th Cir. 1977).
65. This is not to say that the per se rule could never be applied to an NCAA
regulation. That concept might be appropriate where the group took action intended
solely to protect itself or its members from outside economic competition. See Comment,

Traditional notions of the rule of reason must be questioned in a

call for per se analysis. 66 Use of the rule of reason to examine self-

regulatory conduct is a questionable exercise of judicial power.6 7 A
rule of reason inquiry is usually limited to examining the effect of
conduct on economic competition.68 Consequently, courts seek to balance the social benefits of self-regulatory conduct against the eco-

nomic harm such conduct produces. In this regard, they cannot avoid
making decisions according to some equation of social and economic
advantages and disadvantages.6 9 This broad balancing of social values should not be undertaken in the absence of better guidance from
Congress. 0
Although the NCAA and its member schools are nonprofit institutions,7 1 they participate in economic activities largely indistinguishable from the activities of commercial, profit-seeking competitors. 2
National Collegiate Athletic Association's Certification Requirement: A Section One Violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 9 VAL. U.L. REv. 193 (1974). As has been demonstrated in other areas, the fact that a group has authority to regulate does not mean that
its authority is unlimited.
66. As the guardian of an important American tradition, the NCAA's motives
must be accorded a respectful presumption of validity; nevertheless it is well-settled that
a good motive will not validate an otherwise anti-competitive practice. See United States
v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105-06 (1948); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1,
16, n.15 (1945); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n., 166 U.S. 290, 342
(1897).
67. Note, Tackling IntercollegiateAthletics: An Antitrust Analysis, 87 YALE L.J.
655 (1978).
68. "[T]he standard of reason... was intended to be the measure used for the
purpose of determining whether in a given case a particular act had or had not brought
about the wrong against which the statute provided." Standard Oil Co. (N.J.) v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911). The "wrongs" that the statute sought to prevent were the
power to fix prices and limit output and deterioration in quality of monopolized goods.
Id. at 52. See Loevinger, supra note 53, at 33-34. Courts have occasionally referred to
broader social values. See Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 241
(1918) (restrictions on length of working day).
69. Ford Motor Co. v. U.S., 405 U.S. 562, 569 (1972); U.S. v. Phillipsburg Nat'l.
Bank, 399 U.S. 350, 358 (1970); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321, 371 (1963).
70. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196 (1963); Bork, supra
note 53, at 838-39; Loevinger, supra note 53, at 34. State legislatures can also provide
guidance to the courts by enacting laws that eliminate competitive aspects of an activity.
See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
71. The NCAA is a nonprofit association. Because a school must be accredited by
its regional accrediting agency to be eligible for NCAA membership, BYLAWS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, art. 7, § 2
(a)(2) reprinted in NCAA MANUAL supra note 5, at 50, membership is open only to
nonprofit institutions. See Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Ass'n of
Colleges and Secondary Schools 302 F. Supp. 459, 461-62 (D.D.C. 1969), revd, 432
F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
72. The Association engages in many commercial activities. It sponsors 39 championship programs in 18 sports, yielding gross receipts of $6,600,000, negotiates contracts
for television exposure of some of the events in which its member schools participate and
performs many of the functions traditionally associated with trade associations such as:
publishing and distributing sports books, periodicals, rule books, manuals, and films; performing lobbying functions for its members; arranging insurance packages; and sponsor-
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Critics of the NCAA contend that the group's real goal, at least as
far as major college programs are concerned, is not to preserve amateurism, but rather, to manipulate the costs which institutions incur
in operating semi-professional teams.7 3 Other sports organizations
have not been given unlimited discretion in adopting rules and regulations. They have been subjected to treatment under the per se rule
when the purpose of one of their regulations is to eliminate competition.7 4 Moreover, the NCAA control over college football seems
analogous to those of a classic cartel.75
With the power of the NCAA in mind, many commentators have
called for greater accountability of the NCAA,7 6 possibly through
the application of per se analysis. Basic principles in modern law
require that individuals and entities which enjoy significant control
are accountable to those who are regulated." Where the regulator
enjoys essentially exclusive control, more instances of coercion are
likely to occur. Therefore, the pervasiveness of an entity's control
should have some bearing on the degree of deference to be shown to
its rules.
It is necessary to ask whether a particular restriction enhances economic activity or is designed to destroy potential economic competition. Controls that are intended primarily to transfer economic re-

ing various educational, research, and scholarship programs. See G. Hanford, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NEED FOR
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 85

AND

FEASIBILITY

OF

(1974).
73. See Koch, supra note 4, at 139-40. See also K.
supra note 7; J. DURSO, THE SPORTS FACTORY (1975).

A

NATIONAL

DENLINGER &

STUDY

OF

L. SHAPIRO,

74. See, e.g., M & H Tire Company, Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 560 F.
Supp. 591, 604 (D. Mass. 1983); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 381 (D. Ariz.
1983); Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Association, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1264-68
(N.D. Ga. 1973).
75. The NCAA has almost absolute control over the supply of college football which is made available to the networks, to television advertisers, and ultimately to the viewing public. Like all other cartels, NCAA members have
sought and achieved a price for their product which is, in most instances, artificially high. The NCAA cartel imposes production limits on its members, and
maintains mechanisms for punishing cartel members who seek to stray from
these production quotas. The cartel has established a uniform price for the products of each of the member producers, with no regard for the differing quality of
these products or the consumer demand for these various products.
Board of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D. Okla.
1982), afid in part, 707 F.2d 1147 (1983) affd, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
76. See generally Weistart, Antitrust Issues in the Regulation of College Sports,
5 J.C. & U.L. 77 (1977). See J. MICHENER, supra note 8, at 173-223; K. DENLINGER &
L. SHAPIRO, supra note 7, at 22-26; J. DURSO, supra note 73; Koch, supra note 4, at 135.
77. Weistart, Legal Accountability and the NCAA, 10 J.C. & U.L. 167, 172

(1983).

wards from one group of participants to another

would be

particularly suspect. The same would be true of an attempt to disadvantage those who are successful. 78 Antitrust laws will be of concern

in those areas in which associations attempt to use their regulatory
authority to impose significant economic restraints on members or
their employees."
Two arguments justify greater accountability for NCAA rules.80
First, the NCAA's role as an economic regulator should command
considerably less deference than its efforts to insure academic integrity. There is an inherent risk in rules which are in reality intended
to control or contain some members' economic advantage but which
are masked with educational justifications. 8' Second, the athletes'
dependency makes the case for stricter judicial review of their complaints particularly compelling. 2 Courts should be more cautious
when those who formulate an organization's rules choose to encumber the economic opportunities of unrepresented affiliates rather than
bear the direct impact themselves.8 "

Accordingly, NCAA rules regulating the compensation of collegiate athletes should be scrutinized under the per se standard. Although the NCAA faces a difficult task in trying to cope with rising
costs in college athletics, the courts should not grant the NCAA a
special license to tinker with the compensation players receive for

their services.
EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION

The second approach available to Bender is the invocation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In order to in-

voke fourteenth amendment protections, and thus invalidate NCAA
rules pertaining to compensation, the student athlete must initially
show that NCAA activities constitute state action. 4 A few factors
78. Id. at 178.
79. Weistart, supra note 76, at 96.
80. See Weistart, supra note 77, at 173.
81. "Where the academic and entrepeneurial functions are joined, there will be a
heightened need for external regulation." Id. at 177.
82. "There is reason to be suspicious when the form of cost-control chosen from
among the various alternatives has its main impact on those exercising little or no control
over its foundation." Wiestart, supra note 76, at 88.
83. A genuine desire to preserve academic integrity should usually be respected,
but a subtle effort to shift economic fortunes among the regulator's members will encounter much greater skepticism. Weistart, supra note 77, at 178.
84. The fourteenth amendment provides: "nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person.. ,the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. Thus, by its express terms,
the Constitution makes it clear that its equal protection and due process guarantees will
apply only to governmental actions. However, as will be discussed more fully in this
section, the term "State" has been interpreted by courts to include organizations which
are "affected with" state action.
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militate in favor of applying the state action doctrine to the NCAA.

These include financial support and the exercise of a public ffnction
through governmental delegation and control. The public members,

which compose approximately one-half of the NCAA, pay state
funds to the NCAA in the form of annual dues. Moreover, through
its support to colleges and universities, a state may influence and

direct the NCAA. Indirect financial subsidization and state control
also occur when the states provide the facilities in which NCAA athletic contests take place.85 Most importantly, numerous courts, including five federal courts of appeal, have held that NCAA activities
constitute state action for purposes of constitutional scrutiny. 86
Having satisfied the state action prerequisite, the earliest constitu-

tional challenges to NCAA regulations focused on the equal protec-

tion clause. 87 In essence, this fourteenth amendment guarantee de-

mands the uniform treatment of similarly situated persons in relation
to a governmental action.88
In deciding equal protection claims, the judiciary has developed a
two tier standard of review to ascertain whether a classification for

unequal treatment, by an entity exercising state action, is constitu-

tionally permissible.89 On the one hand, a regulation that creates a

classification that involves either a "fundamental" right90 or "sus-

85. Martin, NCAA and the Fourteenth Amendment, II NEW ENG. L. REV. 383,
389-90 (1976); see also Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975).
86. In fact, only one court has held to the contrary. See, e.g., Regents of the
Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1977); Rivas Tenorio v. Liga Athletic
Interuniversitaria, 554 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1977); Hunt v. NCAA, G76-370 C.A. (W.D.
Mich. Sept. 10, 1976); Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo. 1976),
affid per curiam, 570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1978); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1975); Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974); Buckton v. NCAA, 366 F. Supp.
1152 (D. Mass. 1973). Contra McDonald v. NCAA, 370 F. Supp. 625 (C.D. Cal. 1974),
rev'd by implication, Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir.
1974).
87. See supra note 84.
88. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 410 (1977); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315,
324 (1973); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
89. See generally Bradley, Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82
HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1969); see also Gunther, Forward:In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1972).
90. Fundamental interests include the right to travel see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); the right to vote see, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1965); and the right of the criminal defendant
to have access to the judicial process. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963); Griffith v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).

pect" class91 will be subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis. In such a

case, the state must demonstrate a compelling interest by proving
that the statute's purpose is substantial and that the classification as

drawn is necessary to accomplish that purpose.92 On the other hand,
a regulation that involves neither a fundamental right nor a suspect

class is subject to a much more lenient "rational relationship" test,
requiring only that the regulation bear a rational relationship to a

legitimate state objective. 93 In effect, classifications that do not infringe upon fundamental rights or discriminate against suspect
clas94
ses will usually be upheld by the courts as constitutional.
However, there may also be a middle tier test for the application

of the equal protection clause. This third test utilizes a standard of
review more demanding than the traditional rational relationship
test, yet not as exacting as the strict scrutiny approach. By invoking
this middle tier test, courts can avoid recognizing new suspect classifications or fundamental rights, while at the same time being able to
address issues that might otherwise be perfunctorily disposed of
through the rational relationship test.9
Having been defined as an employee using worker's compensation
laws, 96 Bender can raise a few possible arguments to support his con91. Suspect classifications include those based on race, See, e.g., Palmer v. Thomson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); those based on national
origin, see, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S.
214 (1944); and those based on alienage see, e.g., Nyguist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1
(1977); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971).
92. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); see Bradley, supra note 89; 82
HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
93. In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961), Chief Justice Warren
stated that such a classification would be unconstitutional only if it "rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state's objective." See also Weinberger v.
Salfi 422 U.S. 749, 773 (1975); Head v. New Mexico Board, 374 U.S. 424, 432 (1963);
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
94. See Gunther, supra note 89, at 8, wherein the author describes the traditional
rational relationship test as having "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in
fact."
95. For example, cases dealing with sex descrimination fit this text. See, e.g.,
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See generally Gunther, supra note 89.
[T]he rigid two-tier model still holds sway as the Court's articulated description of the equal protection test. . . .The model's two fixed modes of analysis,
strict scrutiny and mere rationality, simply do not describe the inquiry the Court
has undertaken - or should undertake - in equal protection cases. Rather, the
inquiry has been much more sophisticated and the Court should admit as much.
It has focused upon the character of the classification in question, the relative
importance to individuals in the class discriminated against the governmental
benefits that they do not receive, and the state interests asserted in support of
the classification.
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 5-24.
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tention that NCAA sanctions prohibiting his compensation violate
the equal protection clause.97 First, Bender can contend that NCAA
regulations should be subjected to strict scrutiny analysis, treating
employees as a suspect classification.9" This contention seems, at
best, speculative, since historically, suspect classifications have been
established to protect minority groups from discrimination based on
race. Moreover, this equal protection argument has been particularly
ineffective for student athletes attempting to protect their interest in
compensation by maintaining their eligibility. Only an unusual case
will trigger a strict scrutiny analysis of the regulation rendering the
athlete ineligible.9 9 Furthermore, courts have unequivocally held that
the right to participate in amateur athletics is not "fundamental"
and is, therefore, removed from the strict standard of review.
When a strict scrutiny analysis is inapplicable, courts ordinarily
apply the traditional permissive standard, which will uphold a classification if it is reasonably related to the purpose of the legislation. 10 0
The court will presume thet the stated purposes are proper.' 0 ' The
question then becomes whether NCAA rules are reasonably related
to the stated purpose of the NCAA, which is the preservation of
amateurism. Although the rules seem reasonably related to this purpose,102 the essential problem is that establishing a line of demarca97. In general, all other regulations challenged under equal protection have been
held to involve neither suspect classifications nor fundamental interests. They were found
to be rationally related to legitimate NCAA purposes. See, e.g, Colorado Seminary v.
NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885, 897-98 (D. Colo. 1976), affd per curiam, 570 F.2d 320 (10th
Cir. 1978) (NCAA regulation prohibiting receipt of more than minimal compensation
from non-institutional source does not create suspect classification, and furthers NCAA
objections by avoiding practical difficulties of administration and control). But see, Wiley
v. NCAA, No. 76-83-C5 (D. Kan. Aug. 9, 1976).
98. An interesting approach that might subject NCAA regulations to strict scrutiny analysis would be the treatment of students as a suspect classification. See Letwin,
After Goss v. Lopez: Student Status as Suspect Classification?, 29 STAN. L. REV. 627
(1977). In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-39
(1973) the Supreme Court stated that it would recognize only established constitutional
rights as being fundamental. The closest useful analogy for finding employees to be a
suspect class would be a Supreme Court finding that classifications based on wealth are
suspect. See McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
99. See Wiley v. NCAA, No. 76-83-C5 (D. Kan. Aug. 9, 1976). (NCAA regulations prohibiting financial aid from exceeding commonly accepted educational expenses
may violate equal protection clause, when applied to student athletes receiving funds
under a Basic Educational Opportunity Grant in addition to an athletic scholarship).
100. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
101. Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
102. See NCAA BYLAWS 6-5-(d) 0.1. 602 reprinted in, NCAA MANUAL, supra
note 5, at 108.

tion between amateurism and professionalism is an unrealistic goal.
The dividing line between amateurism and professionalism is laden
with ambiguities. 0 3 The extensive financial involvement of American
colleges and universities in athletics makes it difficult to distinguish
their operations from noncollegiate professional enterprises. Moreover, some may consider student athletes professionals inasmuch as
their scholarships and other benefits can be viewed as compensation.' Furthermore, the NCAA constitution provides that student
athletes may be professional in one sport and amateur in another. 0 5
The NCAA's desire to retain a clear demarcation between amateurism and professionalism is unrealistic; professionalism is entrenched throughout college athletics. The courts, therefore, may
logically hold that NCAA rules purport to further a "strained" purpose and thus do not hold up under a rational relationship test.
Finally, Bender can contend that his employment status should be
scrutinized using the middle-tier analysis. Although predicting the
path of the law under this approach is difficult, policies of fairness as
well as justifications for heightened equal protection review militate
in favor of a middle-tier analysis.106
The main theme underlying the minimum scrutiny standard is
that the legislative process will provide adequate opportunity for vindication of the complainant's concerns.107 The NCAA, however, does
not assure the inclusion of the voice of the party regulated, the student athlete. Therefore, courts should conclude that NCAA regulations are entitled to less deference than regulations for which the
potential for internal self-correction is more certain. 08 Consequently,
a court faced with an issue of student employee equal protection
should opt for a middle-tier analysis rather than the rational relation
test.
CONCLUSION

Many commentators have suggested that student athletes are not
amateurs, but professionals. 09 Student athletes receive athletic
scholarships often resembling "pay for play" arrangements violative
of the concept of amateurism. Moreover, there is a disturbing regu103. See P.

WEISS, SPORT: A PHILOSOPHIC INQUIRY 192-211 (1969).
104. See Koch supra note 4.
105. NCAA CONST. art. 3 § I NCAA MANUAL supra note 5, at 9.
106. Weistart, supra note 77. While none of the "traditional" grounds for heightened equal protection review seem to be present, it should still be considered. If the case
for greater accountability is to be made, it will have to be through in a somewhat "nontraditional" doctrine, i.e., the middle tier analysis.
107. Id. at 171.
108. Id. at 170.
109. See J. MICHENER, supra note 8, at 173-223; K. DENLINGER & L. StIAPIRO,
supra note 7, at 22-26; J. DURSO, supra note 73; Koch, supra note 4, at 135.
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larity of allegations of student athletes receiving under-the-table
money and other benefits in exchange for their performance on the
playing field. At the heart of the problem is the NCAA's commitment to segregating amateurism from professionalism. This commitment is clearly unresponsive to the realities that confront the student
athlete today. One solution is adequate compensation of student athletes for their services through recognition of their employment
status.
Realistically, college athletes receive compensation, and this compensation should be recognized as legitimate. An athlete is an "employee" of his or her university, as the term is defined under worker's
compensation statutes. The NCAA's regulation of compensation of
student athletes is a violation of both federal antitrust laws and the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In calling for
greater accountability, the question is how much deference should be
given to NCAA rules which attempt to regulate a student athlete's
economic opportunities in the name of amateurism. It is submitted
that less deference should be given to NCAA rules purporting to
maintain an unrealistic level of amateurism for college athletics today. The student athlete is usually an innocent victim in the scheme
of regulation. He or she should not be made to bear the responsibility of preserving the distinctions between amateurism and professionalism, especially when the mechanism for doing so is in violation of
important constitutional and statutory rights.
LEONARD M. SHULMAN

